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FIXING THE FATAL FLAWS IN OUI IMPLIED 

CONSENT LAWS 

Tina Wescott Cafaro • 
A car swerves from the right lane, into the left and back again. Then, it drifts 
toward the center of the roadway and straddles the centerline. That's when a police 
officer turns on his blue lights and stops the car. While talking to the driver, the officer 
detects the odor of alcohol coming from the driver's breath. As a result, he asks the 
driver to step out of the car and administers field sobriety tests. 1 The driver complies 
and is later arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
(OUI) (also commonly referred to as DUI, DWI or OWl in some jurisdictions). At the 
police station, the driver is given the opportunity to take a test to determine his specific 
measurement of blood alcohol concentration (BAC). 2 When the driver refuses to 
provide a breath, blood, or urine sample, his driver's license is suspended pursuant to 
his state's implied consent laws. Had the driver consented to the BAC test, results 
would have shown intoxication above the legal limit. Although the driver is penalized 
through license suspension, the prosecutor is unable to secure an OUI conviction 
because the jury is hesitant to convict the defendant in the absence ofBAC evidence. 
Unfortunately, this scenario of alcohol impaired driving plays out all too often on 
our nation's roadways. 3 Once every thirty-one minutes the scenario does not end with a 
simple motor vehicle stop and arrest, but ends with a car crash resulting in death. 4 And, 
once every two minutes, the scenario ends in a car crash that nonfatally injures 
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I. Field Sobriety Tests are divided attention tests that require an individual to concentrate on mental and 
physical tasks at the same time. They are used to evaluate an individual's ability to listen to and follow 
simple instructions as well as to evaluate an individual's coordination and motor skills . See Nat') Highway 
Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Development of a Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST) 
Training Management System (200 I), http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/sfst/appendix_a.htm. 
2. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration explains that "[t]he amount of alcohol in a 
person's body is measured by the weight of the alcohol in a certain volume of blood. This is the blood 
alcohol concentration, or 'BAC.' The measurement is based on grams per deciliter (g/dl)." NAT'L HIGHWAY 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE FACTS: .08 BAC "PER SE" LAWS I (1997), 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/outreachlsafesobr/13qp/facts/fact08.pdf. "As of July, 2004, all fifty states, 
along with the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have adopted .08 BAC illegal per se laws, as the legal 
level of intoxication in their state. Illegal per se means that a BAC level above the set limit is a violation in 
and of itself-impairment need not be demonstrated." NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, State 
.08 BAC Laws (July 2004), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/duilbac08.htm (last visited Mar. I, 2008). 
3. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "[i]n 2005, nearly 1.4 million drivers 
were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotics .... That's less than one percent of the 
159 million self-reported episodes of alcohol-impaired driving among U.S. adults each year." CTR. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., IMPAIRED DRIVING, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/drving.htm (last visited Mar. I, 2008). 
4. ld. 
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someone. 5 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reported 
that in 2006, 17,602 people were killed in the United States in alcohol-related motor 
vehicle traffic crashes. 6 This "increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which 
should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the 
battlefield."7 
Implied consent laws, in theory, can be a powerful weapon in the arsenal against 
alcohol impaired driving. However, in practice, the fact is that these laws are not 
deterring OUI. Even though every state has adopted some form of implied consent 
law,8 the number of people dying at the hands of impaired drivers remains alarmingly 
high. Alcohol-related accidents constitute approximately forty-one percent of the 
42,642 total traffic fatalities. 9 These statistics illustrate that motorists are continuing to 
drive while impaired and continue to put everyone at risk of serious injury and death. 
Furthermore, the aforementioned statistics demonstrate that implied consent laws, as 
currently applied, are not achieving the deterrent effect they were designed to have. 
One impediment to the deterrent effect of implied consent laws is the number of 
offenders who refuse a breath test. 1° Convincing a judge or jury to convict an 
individual for committing this crime is not an easy task. 11 The result of the BAC test is 
an extremely valuable piece of evidence in an impaired driving case. If an impaired 
driver refuses a breath test, convincing a jury of the motorist's guilt becomes even more 
difficult. Further exacerbating this problem is the varying manners in which states deal 
with such a refusal and the loopholes that exist within current implied consent laws. All 
these factors detract from the aim of the laws, which is deterring impaired driving. 
This article explores the use of implied consent laws as a method of deterring and 
punishing alcohol-impaired driving. Part I introduces the history and purpose of 
implied consent laws. Part II discusses the inadequacies of current statutory implied 
consent provisions and their failure to effectively attain their designed purpose. This 
section also highlights two particularly detrimental aspects of the law as currently 
5. !d. 
6. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS, 
RESEARCH NOTE, 2006 TRAFFIC SAFETY ANNuAL ASSESSMENT-ALCOHOL-RELATED FATALITIES, 
www .nhtsa.dot.gov/portallnhtsa_static_file_downloader.jsp?file=/staticfiles/DOT /NHTSA/NCSNContent!R 
Notes/2007/810821.pdf. 
7. Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,439 (1957). 
8. See infra note 42 (explaining that the District of Columbia became the last of all the jurisdictions to 
enact an implied consent law in 1972). See also Matthew J. Dougherty, Constitutional Law-Implied Consent 
Laws: Fourth Amendment Plus Protection for the Drunk Driver. Hays v. City of Jacksonville, 518 So. 2d 892 
(Ala.Crim.App. 1987), 19 Cumb. L. Rev. 177, 177 n.3 (1988) (citing the implied consent laws of the fifty 
states). 
9. Mothers Against Drunk Driving - Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving - Statistics, 
http://rnadd.org/Drunk-Driving!Drunk-Driving/Statistics/AIIStats.aspx#STAT_I (last visited Mar. I, 2008). 
10. As a result of the number of people refusing to take BAC tests, the NHTSA commissioned a study to 
determine the impact breath test refusals have on QUI. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP'T OF TRANSP. BREATH TEST REFUSALS IN OWl ENFORCEMENT: AN INTERIM REPORT (2005), available at 
http://www .nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/Breath TestRefusallirnages/Breath Test Text. pdf [hereinafter 
BREATH TEST REFUSALS]. 
II. See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social 
Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 Duke J. Gender L. Pol'y I, 68 (2002) (discussing the continuing 
attitude and willingness ofjurors to acquit in QUI cases and citing a study that found while "jurors continue to 
acquit more frequently than do judges, judicial willingness to acquit has increased since 1958"). 
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implemented: (1) the lack of uniformity in the application of the laws by individual 
states; and (2) the disparate treatment of persons who refuse to submit to BAC testing, 
both in terms of consequences of refusal to submit to testing and evidentiary use at trial. 
Ultimately, this article espouses the notion that evidence of a defendant's BAC is 
one of the most valuable and persuasive pieces of evidence in an OUI case and is 
directly linked to the deterrence function of implied consent laws. BAC evidence may 
exonerate an individual who is wrongfully charged 12 and may help to convict an 
individual who is impaired. By denying the prosecution the ability to collect and use 
this evidence, the likelihood of conviction is greatly reduced. Part III provides statutory 
guidance to ensure that implied consent laws are meaningful and powerful law 
enforcement tools that effectively achieve their stated purpose: a reduction in the 
number of intoxicated drivers on the highways. If a motorist refuses to provide a BAC 
sample, there should be a separate criminal charge rather than just an administrative 
penalty. Additionally, the prosecution should be permitted to present evidence to the 
factfinder about the defendant's refusal to submit to BAC testing. 
When death or serious bodily injury results from a car crash, compulsory BAC 
testing must be administered to the operator. Furthermore, the administrative sanction 
for refusing to submit to the test should be harsher than the administrative sanction for 
testing over the legal limit. Finally, when an individual's license is suspended for a 
refusal, the license should only be reinstated after the entire suspension period is over. 
These changes to current statutory implied consent provisions are necessary; otherwise, 
implied consent in an OUI context is meaningless. 
OVERVIEW OF IMPLIED CONSENT LAWS 
Implied consent laws state that all operators of motor vehicles are deemed to have 
consented to a BAC test if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the driver is 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 13 These laws provide 
"a statutory structure for suspending the license of a driver who refuses to submit to 
12. Most states have a provision requiring that a person who tests below a certain limit must be released 
from custody. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24( I)( e) (2007) ("If such evidence is that such percentage 
was five one-hundredths or less, there shaH be a permissible inference that such defendant was not under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, and he shaH be released from custody forthwith ...."). In Minnesota, 
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.51 (2007), a BAC of 0.05 percent or Jess is prima facie evidence that driver 
was not under the influence. 
13. For example, Massachusetts is an implied consent state where, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 
24( I)( f)( I) (2007), all operators of motor vehicles are deemed to have consented to a breath test if suspected 
of OUI simply by virtue of driving a car. This statute provides: 
Whoever operates a motor vehicle upon any way ... shall be deemed to have consented to submit 
to a chemical test or analysis of his breath or blood in the event that he is arrested for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . . Such test shall be administered 
at the direction of a police officer, as defined in section one of chapter ninety C, having reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person arrested has been operating a motor vehicle upon such way or 
place while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
!d. See also 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 154 7 (2006) ("Any person who drives, operates or is in actual physical 
control of the movement of a vehicle in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or 
more chemical tests of breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or 
the presence of a controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have 
been driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle."). 
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testing for alcohol concentration." 14 The purpose of these laws is "to reduce the 
incidence of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take 
alcohol concentration tests; the statute was not meant to protect drivers." 15 
An implied consent statute's "central feature is that any person who drives on the 
public highways is deemed to have consented to a chemical test to determine the 
alcohol or drug content of the person's blood." 16 The rationale behind this is that "[t]he 
right to drive a motor vehicle on the public streets is not a natural right but a privilege, 
subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest." 17 The principle that driving is a 
privilege and not a right has been recognized by courts for almost 100 years. 18 The 
concept that drivers have impliedly consented to a BAC test grew out of the recognition 
that impaired driving "occurs with tragic frequency on our nation's highways[,]" 19 
coupled with the "necessity to make the relatively new technology of chemical testing 
for blood alcohol meaningful."20 As such, these test results have been admitted m 
evidence in impaired driving cases since the 1940s. 21 
14. 3A MARYLAND LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA Automobiles and Motor Vehicles § 96 (2007); see also Ruble 
v. Kan. Dep't. of Revenue, 973 P.2d 213, 215 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (The suspension of an individual's 
driving privileges "is part of the civil regulatory scheme that fosters public safety by restricting the driving 
privileges of[an individual] who has exhibited dangerous driving behavior."). 
15. 3A MARYLAND LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA Automobiles and Motor Vehicles § 96; see also Furthmyer v. 
Kan. Dep't of Revenue, 888 P.2d 832, 835 (Kan. 1995) (stating that the statute's purpose is to coerce 
acquiescence to chemical testing through the threat of statutory penalties such as license revocation and the 
admission into evidence in a DUI proceeding of the fact of test refusal); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 
923 A.2d 100, 108 (Md. 2007) ("In response to the public concern about the dangers of drunk driving, the 
Maryland General Assembly rewrote §16-205.1, referring to the rewritten statute as Maryland's 'implied 
consent' and 'administrative per se' law against drunk driving."); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 739 
A.2d 58, 68 (Md. 1999) ("The Commonwealth's interest in public safety is substantially served by the 
summary suspension of those who refuse in several ways to take a breath-analysis test upon arrest. First, the 
very existence of the summary sanction of the statute serves as a deterrent to drunken driving. Second, it 
provides strong inducement to take the breath-analysis test and thus effectuates the Commonweath' s interest 
in obtaining reliable and relevant evidence for use in subsequent criminal proceedings. Third, in promptly 
removing such drivers from the road, the summary sanction of the statute contributes to the safety of public 
highways."); Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Mo. 2002) (citing Shine v. Dir. of Revenue, 
807 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)) (the purpose of implied consent law is "to rid the highways of 
drunk drivers"); Todd v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 723 A.2d 655, 658 
(Pa. 1999) ("The implied consent provisions of the Vehicle Code were enacted to address the hazard of 
impaired drivers on public roads."). 
16. Hinnah, 77 S.W.3d at 619. 
17. Standish v. Dep't. of Revenue, 683 P.2d 1276, 1281 (Kan. 1984). 
18. People v. Rosenheimer, 102 N.E. 530, 532 (N.Y. 1913) ("(T]he whole of this argument rests on the 
proposition that in operating a motor vehicle the operator exercises a privilege which might be denied him, 
and not a right, and that in a case of a privilege the legislature may prescribe on what conditions it shall be 
exercised."). 
19. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) (where the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
"[t]he carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here. This Court, 
although not having the daily contact with the problem that the state courts have, has repeatedly lamented the 
tragedy."). 
20. John Hoffman, Implied Consent with a Twist: Adding Blood to New Jersey's Implied Consent Law 
and Criminalizing Refusal Where Drinking and Driving Results in Death or Serious Injury, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 
345, 356 (2004). 
21. /d. (citing John H. Williamson, The Attorney's Handbook on Drinking and Driving Defense 50 (2d 
ed. 1995)); see, e.g., Touchton v. State, 18 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1944) (en bane) (allowing the use of blood 
chemical tests); People v. Haeussler, 260 P.2d 8 (Cal. 1953) (en bane) (allowing the use of blood tests as 
admissible evidence); People v. Sobczyk, 99 N.E.2d 567 (111. App. Ct. 1951) (allowing the use of breath 
tests); People v. Stringfield, 185 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) (finding breathalyzer test results raised a 
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I. HISTORY OF IMPLIED CONSENT IN THE CONTEXT OF QUI LAW 
The Supreme Court first recognized the basic principle of an implied consent law in 
connection with motor vehicle use in 1927 when it held that a state can condition the 
use of its highways by finding that an alien motorist had impliedly consented to suit 
within its jurisdiction. 22 Over the ensuing years, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of implied consent laws under the Due Process Clause as well as under 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 23 The emergence of breathalyzer 
instruments24 provided a useful tool for law enforcement, and in 1953, New York 
became the first state to enact an implied consent law requiring a motorist suspected of 
driving while intoxicated to submit to a BAC test. 25 This law was challenged in Schutt 
v. Macduff 26 
In that case, the petitioner Louis E. Schutt's driver's license was revoked by the 
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles after Mr. Schutt refused to submit to a blood test as 
demanded by a police officer following his arrest for driving while intoxicated. 27 The 
petitioner argued that the implied consent law violated his right to avoid self­
incrimination,28 that the collection of such evidence constituted an unlawful search and 
seizure,29 that the statute violated an individual's right to equal protection of the law,30 
and that the statute violated the Due Process Clause. 31 In discussing the purpose of the 
statute, the court stated that there was an "urgent need for legislation looking toward the 
procurement of chemical tests for the purpose of definitely determining whether or not 
an accused driver was intoxicated to the extent of impairing his driving ability."32 The 
statute's authority rested upon the notion that a person has a "privilege" to drive and not 
a protected constitutional "right."33 Importantly, the court recognized that "[t]he 
legislature has the undoubted power to reasonably regulate the use of the highways and 
may impose reasonable conditions to be complied with to entitle one to a license to 
drive upon the highways."34 
presumption of intoxication). 
22. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (holding that a state may condition the use of its 
highways by finding that an alien motorist had impliedly consented to suit within its jurisdiction). 
23. See, e.g., Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36 (1941) (license suspension did not violate Due Process 
Clause as "[t]he use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the 
reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent"); Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 432 (implied consent provision 
did not violate due process protections); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (implied consent 
provisions did not violate the Due Process Clause or Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights). 
24. In 1938, Indiana University's Professor Rolla N. Harger introduced the Drunkometer, the first stable 
instrument for testing breath alcohol. In 1954, Indiana University's Professor Robert F. Borkenstein invented 
the Breathalyzer. History of Breathalyzer, http://www.breathalyzer.org/history.html (discussing the history of 
the breathalyzer test) (last visited Mar. I, 2008). 
25. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW§ 1194.2 (McKinney 2001) (originally enacted by L.l953, c. 854). 
26. Schutt v. Macduff, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954). 
27. /d. at 119. 
28. /d. at 122. 
29. /d. at 124. 
30. !d. at 125. 
31. Schutt, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 125. 
32. /d.atl21. 
33. /d. at 121-22 (citing People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 120, 121, 102 N.E. 530, 532 (1913); 
Heart v. Fletcher, 184 Misc. 569, 53 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1945)). 
34. !d. at 122. 
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Ultimately, the court refused to allow the petitioner's claim based upon a violation 
36of the self-incrimination clause, 35 search and seizure clause, or on grounds of equal 
protection.37 The court did, however, find that the statute violated the Due Process 
Clause in two ways. First, the court noted that the statute contained no procedural 
safeguards, since it did not require reasonable suspicion of impaired driving prior to a 
request that the motorist submit to a BAC test, nor did the offender have to be 
arrested. 38 Second, the statute failed to provide the driver with a subsequent 
opportunity to be heard. 39 
The systemic problem of impaired driving also caught the attention of national 
politics and on June 26, 1967, the Secretary of Transportation issued the first of thirteen 
40
National Uniform Standards for State Highway Safety Programs. This report 
provided that "[ e ]ach state ... shall ... implement a program to achieve a reduction in 
those traffic accidents arising in whole or in part from persons driving under the 
41
influence of alcohol" and that each program must provide for an implied consent law. 
Over the next few years, those states without existing implied consent laws enacted 
42such statutes. As the states enacted implied consent laws, the Supreme Court was 
called upon to evaluate the constitutionality of these laws. The implied consent law of 
43Massachusetts was challenged in Mackey v. Montrym. The statute provided that: 
Whoever operates a motor vehicle upon any [public] way . . . shall be 
deemed to have consented to submit to a chemical test or analysis of his 
breath in the event that he is arrested for operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor .... If the person arrested refuses 
to submit to such test or analysis, after having been informed that his license 
... to operate motor vehicles ... in the Commonwealth shall be suspended 
for a period of ninety days for such refusal, no such test or analysis shall be 
made, but the police officer before whom such refusal was made shall 
44immediately prepare a written report of such refusal. 
The Supreme Court was confronted with a procedural due process claim asserting 
that automatic suspension of a driver's license upon refusal to submit to an alcohol 
breath test was a violation of the Due Process Clause. In Mackey, the defendant was 
45 46arrested for OUI. When asked to submit to a breath test, he refused. Twenty 
35. !d. at 123. 
36. Schutt, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 124. 
37. /d.at125. 
38. !d. at 126. 
39. !d. at 127. 
40. S. REP. No. 92-1262, at 5 (1972) (citing H.R. Doc. No. 138, at 9-10 (1966)). 
41. S. REP. No. 92-1262 at 5. 
42. On October 4, 1972, the District of Columbia became the last of all the jurisdictions to enact an 
implied consent law. S. REP. No. 92-1262, at 4 ("Comparable [implied consent] provisions are now law in all 
States. The District of Columbia is the sole remaining jurisdiction without an 'implied consent' law."). 
43. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. I (1977). 
44. /d. at 3-4 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(l)(t) (West Supp. 1979)). 
45. !d. at 5. 
46. /d. 
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minutes later, after speaking to his attorney, the defendant said he wanted to take the 
test. 47 The officers, having already documented the initial refusal as prescribed by 
law,48 refused to give the defendant a second test.49 The defendant claimed the 
automatic suspension of his license by the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles 
without affording him a hearing violated his due process rights. 50 
The Court analyzed the case according to the factors decided in Matthews v. 
Eldridge. 51 In determining the dictates of procedural due process, Eldridge holds that 
three factors are to be considered: ( 1) the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substituted procedural 
safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 52 Applying this test, the Supreme Court held that while the 
defendant had a strong property interest in his driver's license, 53 "the compelling 
interest in highway safety justifie[ d] the Commonwealth in making a summary 
suspension effective pending the outcome of the prompt post suspension hearing 
available. "54 
That same year, in Dixon v. Love,55 the Supreme Court evaluated whether an 
Illinois statute provided constitutionally adequate procedures for suspending or 
revoking the license of a driver who was repeatedly convicted of traffic offenses. 56 
This statute allowed the Secretary of State 
to exercise discretionary authority to suspend or revoke the license or permit of any 
person without a preliminary hearing, or to decline to suspend or revoke such driving 
privileges. In making a determination of the action to be taken, the Secretary of State 
shall take into consideration the severity of the offense and conviction, the number of 
offenses and convictions, and prior suspensions or revocations on the abstract of the 
57driver's record. 
If a motorist had three moving traffic violations within a twelve month period, the 
Secretary of State had the authority under this statute to suspend that driver's license. 58 
Upon license suspension or revocation, a motorist was afforded the opportunity to give 
47. /d. 
48. The officers refused to administer the test under the section of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90 § 24(1 )(f) 
which provided "[l]f the person arrested refuses to submit to such test or analysis ... the police officer before 
whom such refusal was made shall immediately prepare a written report of such refusal." Mackey, 443 U.S. 
at 5 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(I)(f) (West Supp.l979)) (emphasis added). 
49. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 5. 
50. !d. at I. 
51. /d. at 10 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 
52. !d. at 10 (citing Matthews, 424 U.S at 335). 
53. /d. at II. 
54. Mackey, 443 U.S. at II. 
55. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). 
56. /d. at I 06. 
57. !d. at 107 (referring to 95 1/2 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 6-206(a) (1975) (now codified at 625 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/6-206 (2007))). 
58. /d. at 108 (referring to 95 1/2 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 6-206(a)(2) (1975) (now codified at 625 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/6-206(a)(2) (2007))). 
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written notice to the Secretary of State requesting a hearing, which was to be scheduled 
within twenty days of receiving such notice. 59 
In Dixon, a twenty-five year old truck driver received three speeding tickets within 
a twelve month period and received written notice that his license was suspended. 60 In 
lieu of requesting a hearing, the driver joined a class action suit seeking declaratory 
judgment that the Illinois statute was unconstitutional. 61 The Court held that while the 
Due Process Clause applied to the deprivation of a driver's license,62 it was also 
"equally clear that a licensee in Illinois eventually can obtain all the safeguards 
procedural due process could be thought to require before a discretionary suspension or 
revocation becomes final." 63 The main issue was not with the violation of due process 
in total, but rather the timing of the suspension and the lack of an opportunity to be 
heard before suspension. 64 
Applying the factors of the Eldridge test, 65 the Court first held that the private 
interest in a driver's license was "not so great as to require us 'to depart from the 
ordinary principle, established by our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary 
hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action. "'66 Next, the Court held 
that the risk of erroneous deprivation was minimal. The regulations were largely 
automatic, and the written objection by the motorist would notify the Secretary of any 
clerical errors that may have led to an erroneous suspension. Additional safeguards 
beyond those provided would "be unlikely to have significant value in reducing the 
number of erroneous deprivations."67 Finally, the Court held that the governmental 
interest was "sufficiently visible and weighty for the State to make its summary initial 
decision effective without a pre-decision administrative hearing."68 In accordance with 
prior cases, the Court made it clear that the State had the right and the authority to 
condition an individual's right to operate a motor vehicle. 
In Breithaupt v. Abram,69 the Supreme Court addressed a constitutional challenge 
to the manner in which an implied consent law is enforced. More specifically, the 
Court decided whether it was a violation of due process to withdraw blood from an 
unconscious person who was unable to consent when the sole purpose of doing so was 
to determine the BAC after that person was involved in a serious car accident. 70 In 
Breithaupt, the Petitioner was injured when the truck he was driving collided with a 
passenger vehicle, killing the three passengers in that vehicle. 71 The petitioner, who 
was unconscious, was taken by ambulance to the hospital. At the hospital, a state police 
59. !d. at 109. 
60. Dixon, 431 U.S. at 110-11. 
61. !d. 
62. !d. at 112. 
63. !d. 
64. !d. 
65. See Mackey, 443 U.S. at 10. 
66. Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976)). 
67. !d. at 113-14. 
68. !d. at 115. 
69. 352 u.s. 432 (1957). 
70. !d. at 439-440. 
71. !d. at 433. 
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officer noticed the smell of alcohol on the petitioner's breath and asked the doctor to 
draw blood to test the petitioner's BAC. 72 The doctor did so, and the results of the 
blood test yielded a BAC of 0.17 percent. 73 The petitioner was charged and convicted 
of involuntary manslaughter, in part because his BAC was used as evidence against 
h. 741m. 
The petitioner claimed that his due process rights were violated when the doctor 
drew blood at the request of law enforcement. The Court found that "[t]he blood test 
procedure has become routine in our everyday life. It is a ritual for those going into 
military service as well as those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges require 
such tests before permitting entrance and literally millions of us have voluntarily gone 
through the same." 75 As such, the Court concluded that "a blood test taken by a skilled 
technician is not such 'conduct that shocks the conscience."' 76 Next, the Court looked 
at the Government interest involved in the issue, noting: 
As against the right of an individual that his person be held inviolable, even against 
so slight an intrusion as is involved in applying a blood test of the kind to which 
millions of American submit as a matter of course nearly every day, must be set the 
interests of society in the scientific determination of intoxication, one of the great 
causes of the mortal hazards of the road. 77 
The Court further opined that "[t]he increasing slaughter on our highways, most of 
which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the 
battlefield."78 Ultimately, the Court held that the Government's interest in protecting 
public safety by combating impaired driving outweighed the minimal intrusion of a 
blood test taken without consent. 79 
Schmerber v. California was also a case in which police officers requested that a 
doctor at a hospital withdraw blood from the driver of an automobile involved in an 
accident. 80 Here, however, the driver was conscious at the time the blood was 
withdrawn and objected to the procedure. 81 After his conviction for QUI, the petitioner 
argued that the involuntary and nonconsensual withdrawal of blood for purposes of 
determining BAC deprived him of his constitutional protections against unreasonable 
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment. 82 He also argued that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
was violated. 83 
The Court, relying on Breithaupt, began its analysis by holding that taking blood in 
72. !d. 
73. /d. A BAC of 0.17 percent is over Iwice the current legal limit of 0.08 percent. 
74. Breithaupt. 352 U.S. at 433. 
75. /d. at 436. 
76. !d. at 437 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)). 
77. /d. at 439. 
78. /d. at 439. 
79. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439. 
80. 384 U.S. 757,758 (1966). 
81. !d. at 759. 
82. !d. 
83. /d. 
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the manner done in this case did not offend that sense of justice that shocks the 
conscience and "nothing in the circumstances of this case or in supervening events 
persuades us that this aspect of Breithaupt should be overruled."84 The opinion further 
stated, "we 'cannot see that it should make any difference whether one states 
unequivocally that he objects or resorts to physical violence in protest or is in such 
condition that he is unable to protest."'85 
The Court then held that the Fifth Amendment privilege "protects an accused only 
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with 
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood 
and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these 
ends."86 The blood test in no way implicated the petitioner's "testimonial capacity," 
since the only act he was compelled to do was "donate" his blood which "was irrelevant 
to the results of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone."87 As a 
result of this finding, the Court held that since the petitioner did not have a right to 
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, he likewise could not claim that he should have 
been afforded counsel during the procedure. 88 
Finally, the Court analyzed whether the chemical analysis of the defendant's blood 
should have been excluded from evidence as the product of an unconstitutional search 
and seizure. It is clear that the taking of a person's blood is a search of the "person," 
specifically within the scope of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 89 "[T]he 
Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, 
but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in 
an improper manner."90 In this case, the officer had probable cause to arrest the 
petitioner and charge him with OUI based upon the petitioner's appearance, specifically 
his "bloodshot, watery, sort of ... glassy" eyes and the smell of alcohol on the 
petitioner's breath. 91 The question remained, however, whether the officer was 
required to obtain a search warrant prior to the blood withdrawal. 92 The Court found 
that the attempt to secure the evidence through a blood test was appropriate incident to 
the petitioner's arrest in this case because the officer "reasonably believed that he was 
confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under 
the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence[.]"'93 
In 1983, the Supreme Court decided whether an individual's refusal to submit to a 
BAC test was admissible in evidence at a criminal trial, an issue that was not before the 
Court in Schmerber. 94 In South Dakota v. Neville, the Supreme Court was confronted 
84. /d. at 760. 
85. Schmerber, 384 U.S .. at 760 n.4 (quoting Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 441 (Warren, C. J., dissenting)). 
86. /d. at 761. 
87. !d. at 765. 
88. /d. at 765-66. 
89. ld .at 767. 
90. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. 
91. /d. at 768-69. 
92. /d. at 770. 
93. /d. at 770-71. 
94. !d. at 765 n.9. 
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with a South Dakota statute that allowed the introduction of such refusal evidence. 95 
The petitioner argued that the introduction of this evidence at trial violated the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 96 
The Court started its analysis of the issue by affirming the Schmerber decision 
allowing a State to force a person suspected of impaired driving to submit to a blood 
alcohol test and recognizing that "South Dakota . . . declined to authorize its police 
officers to administer a blood-alcohol test against the suspect's wi11."97 Instead of 
authorizing police officers to administer nonconsensual BAC tests, South Dakota 
enacted administrative loss of license sanctions for a refusal and allowed the refusal to 
be used against the defendant at trial. 98 
The Neville Court held that admission of such evidence does not offend one's 
privilege against self-incrimination.99 The Court opined that the Fifth Amendment only 
prohibits "the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the 
privilege" 100and that "the State did not directly compel respondent to refuse the test, for 
it gave him the choice of submitting to the test or refusing." 101 The Court recognized 
"that the choice to submit or refuse to take a blood-alcohol test will not be an easy or 
pleasant one for a suspect to make. But the criminal process often requires suspects and 
defendants to make difficult choices." 102 Accordingly, the Court held "that a refusal to 
take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act 
coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self­
incrimination."103 The Court's ruling in Neville was consistent with the majority of 
state court decisions on the question of whether to allow refusal testimony into 
evidence. 104 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that implied consent laws are 
constitutional as long as the statutes provide procedural safeguards to the motorist. 105 It 
is a waste of public resources and energy to continue debating what is now well-settled 
law. Instead, public safety would be better served by focusing on efforts to maximize 
the effectiveness of laws designed to curtail impaired driving. 
95. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 
96. Jd. at 556. 
97. !d. at 559. 
98. Jd. 
99. !d. at 564. 
100. Neville, 459 U.S. at 562 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976)). 
101. !d. 
102. Jd. at 564. 
103. !d. 
104. !d. at 560-61 ("Most courts applying general Fifth Amendment principles to the refusal to take a 
blood test have found no violation of the privilege against self-incrimination."). Those that do find a violation 
of Fifth Amendment principles emphasize that the refusal is "'a tacit or overt expression and communication 
of defendant's thoughts' ... and that the Constitution 'simply forbids any compulsory revealing or 
communication of an accused person's thoughts or mental processes, whether it is by acts, failure to act, 
words spoken or failure to speak."' !d. at 561 (citation omitted). 
105. See M. Elizabeth Fuller, Comment, Implied Consent Statutes: What Is Refusal?, 9 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 423, 425-27 (1986). 
110 Journal ofLegislation [Vol. 34:2 
II. RECOGNIZING THE FLAWS IN IMPLIED CONSENT LAWS 
BAC tests offer the best, most definitive way to determine if an individual is 
106
operating a motor vehicle while impaired. The major impediment to successful 
prosecution of OUI cases is that many motorists refuse to submit to the BAC tests. In 
August 2005, the NHTSA issued an interim report regarding the obstacle BAC refusals 
107 
pose to OUI enforcement. This report documented a study conducted in 2001 of 
108
BAC refusal rates in all fifty states. The study reported BAC refusal rates as high as 
10984.9 percent. The stark results of this study, and others like it, demonstrate the ease 
110
and frequency with which people disregard implied consent laws. The indifference 
toward such laws clearly indicates that the current method of implementing and 
enforcing implied consent laws does little to encourage an OUI suspect to take the BAC 
test. 
The most common mechanism police officers employ to persuade motorists to 
submit to a BAC test is the threat of administrative suspension of the individual's 
driver's license in response to a refusal. With the notable exception of Nevada, all 
111 
states impose administrative sanctions for refusal. However, current administrative 
loss of license systems lack uniformity in the structure of these sanctions. The 
suspension period for a first time BAC refusal varies greatly from state to state, with 
112 113. . d . fi . d . h h A thsuspensiOn peno s rangmg rom nmety ays to e1g teen mont s. no er 
disparity in the sanctioning process is the distinction between "a 'hard' suspension 
106. See Robert B. Beauchamp, Note, "Shed Thou No Blood": The Forcible Removal of Blood Samples 
from Drunk Driving Suspects, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1115, 1116 (1987) ("In the case of the drinking driver, the 
collection of evidence is complicated by two factors: (I) the best evidence of intoxication is harbored within 
the body of the suspect; and (2) evidence of blood alcohol dissipates over time as the result of natural 
metabolic processes. As a result, the suspected drunk driver who simply refuses to submit to any procedure 
for determining his or her blood alcohol content, in the absence of some form of coercion, drastically reduces 
the probability of conviction. Lacking chemical evidence of the precise degree of intoxication at the time of 
arrest, the state must rely on evidence inherently less accurate."). See also, Standish v. Dep't of Revenue, 
Motor Vehicle Div., 683 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Kan. 1984) ("The chemical testing system provided under our 
Implied Consent Law is important because it provides the best available and most reliable method of 
determining whether a driver is 'under the influence' of alcohol."). 
I07. See BREATH TEST REFUSALS, supra note I 0. 

I08. !d. at 6 tbl. I. 

109. !d. (documenting refusal rates for the year of2001 in all fifty states with some of the highest refusal 
percentages coming from Rhode Island (84.9%), Louisiana (45.9%), Texas (40.6%), Ohio (40.4%), Illinois 
(38.3%), Florida (37.1 %), Idaho (31.6%), and Alabama (31.1 %)). 
110. See generally NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP'T OF TRANSP., IMPAIRED-DRIVING 
PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS: A SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS (1991-2003), DOT HS 809 815 (2004), 
available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/regrev/evaluate/809815/images/Part !.pdf. 
Ill. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS, LAWS, 
BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION TEST REFUSAL LAWS, DOT HS 810 723W (2007), available at 
http://www .nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/TSFLaws!PD Fs/81 0723 W .pdf [hereinafter BLOOD ALCOHOL 
CONCENTRATION TEST REFUSAL LAWS). 
112. See Ala. Code § 32-5-192(c) (2007) ("If a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a law 
enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test ... on the first refusal ... the director shall deny to the 
person the issuance ofa license or permit, for a period of 90 days ...."). 
113. Utah has the longest suspension period for a first time BAC test refuser. See Utah Code Ann.§ 41­
6a-521(5)(a)(i) (2007) ("If ... the person was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to 
submit to the test or tests ... the Driver License Division shall revoke the person's license or permit to operate 
a motor vehicle in Utah ... for a period of(i) 18 months ...."). 
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period in which no driving is allowed for a specified period ... [or] a 'soft' suspension 
period in which drivers can obtain a temporary driving permit for purposes such as 
work and church ...." 114 Allowing these hardship licenses works against the purpose 
and deterrent effect of implied consent Jaws. When a motorist knows that a BAC 
refusal revocation is not an absolute Joss of license because they can get a hardship 
license, the sting of the punishment for the refusal is minimal, and the deterrent effect 
eliminated. 
Even in light of the threat of license suspension, many motorists continue to refuse 
to submit to the test. 115 Typically, after an individual is arrested for OUI, the police 
inform the arrestee of the implied consent Jaw, including the license suspension penalty 
for refusing to submit to the test, and formally request that the arrestee submit to a BAC 
test. 116 For many people, the minimal administrative penalty, especially in light of its 
loopholes, is more palatable than a criminal conviction and the accompanying stigma 
. hm 117and pums ent. 
A BAC reading of 0.08 percent or above provides the prosecution with an 
important, tangible piece of evidence for use at trial that will help obtain a 
conviction. 118 Many motorists know it is a difficult task for the prosecution to obtain a 
114. See BREATH TEST REFUSALS, supra note 10, at 3. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §343.305(10)(b)(2) (2004) 
("[F]or the first improper refusal, the court shall revoke the person's operating privilege for one year. After 
the first 30 days ofthe revocation period, the person is eligible for an occupational license under s. 343.10.") 
(emphasis added). 
115. BREATH TEST REFUSALS, supra note 10, at I (asserting that the percentage of offenders who refuse a 
breath test has been a problem in many states). 
116. 	 In Massachusetts, law enforcement officers inform an individual of their rights by reading a 
"Statutory Rights and Consent Form." As it relates to the Implied Consent Law, it reads: 
Pursuant to General Laws Ch. 90, Sec. 24: 
I. 	 I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test to determine your blood alcohol 
concentration. 
2. 	 Drivers Age 2 I or OVER: If you refuse this test, your license or right to operate in 
Massachusetts shall be suspended for at least a period of 180 days or up to life for such 
refusal. The suspension if you take the test and fail it is 30 days. 
Drivers UNDER Age 21: If you refuse this test, your license or right to operate in 
Massachusetts shall be suspended for at least a period of 3 years or up to life for such 
refusal. The suspension if you take the test and fail it is 30 days. Drivers under age 2 I 
will also face an additional suspension pursuant to General Laws Chapter 90, Section 
24P of 180 days to I year. 
3. 	 If your blood alcohol level is .08 or above, you are in violation of Massachusetts law 
and may face criminal penalties. Drivers under age 21 have the same legal limit for 
court purposes, but will face administrative penalties for any blood alcohol 
concentration of .02 or above. 
4. 	 If you decide to take the test and complete it, you will have the right to a comparison 
blood test within a reasonable period of time at your own expense. The results of this 
comparison test can be used to restore your license or right to operate at a court hearing 
within I 0 days. 
It is not your option which type of chemical test to take. Refusal or failure to consent to take the 
test that I am requesting is a violation of the Implied Consent Law, and will result in your right to 
operate a motor vehicle being suspended as I have stated to you. Refusing this test, but requesting 
some other form of test is a refusal under the law. 
Statutory Rights and Consent Form, MA RMV Form No.:21202 (on file with author). 
117. BREATH TEST REFUSAL, supra note I 0, at iii (Individuals refused to take a breath test even though 
this decision subjected the individuals to implied consent penalties because the refusal "may help offenders 
avoid a DWI conviction, which carries more severe penalties."). 
118. 	 Standish v. Dep't of Revenue, 683 P.2d 1276, 1281 (Kan. 1984). 
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conviction in an OUI trial, absent a BAC reading. 119 The NHTSA has recognized the 
impact of a person's refusal: 
[When] a person refuses the BAC test, that person is more likely to contest the case. 
The Jack of BAC test results clouds the case just enough to give the defense an 
advantage it does not have when there are test results. Defense attorneys usually 
attack the police reports and the behavioral cues reported by the officer or trooper. 
Without a BAC test, these reported cues are the only evidence the State has of the 
, . . . h . f 120person s mtox!Catwn at t e ttme o arrest. 
In addition, when a state refuses to allow the prosecution to introduce evidence of 
the defendant's refusal at trial, it is extremely difficult for the prosecution to meet its 
burden of proof. 121 There is wide-spread public information and common knowledge 
about breathalyzer testing. 122 Therefore, jurors expect to hear BAC evidence and 
engage in speculation when such evidence is absent. 123 Such speculation can be fatal to 
the prosecution's case as jurors may believe that "the police didn't offer the 
breathalyzer to a defendant [because they didn't think the defendant was too 
intoxicated] or perhaps the breathalyzer was not in working order." 124 
Another problem with administrative sanctions is that they may impact a judge at 
sentencing after a criminal conviction for QUI. When sentencing a defendant convicted 
of OUI, "U]udges in many jurisdictions do not impose the maximum penalties for the 
first or repeat offenses. They may take the administrative penalties into account when 
considering criminal penalties by running court-imposed license suspensions 
concurrently with administrative license suspensions instead of consecutively." 125 Also 
undermining the deterrent effect of an administrative loss of license is a loophole in 
119. Taslitz, supra note II, at 68. 
120. BREATH TEST REFUSALS, supra note I 0, at 21. 
121. Several states do not, as a matter of course, allow such refusal testimony into evidence. See id. at 
App. A. Michigan admits a refusal, but the refusal cannot be used as evidence of guilt. Hawaii considers a 
test refusal only during an administrative license revocation hearing. Virginia allows admissibility only under 
very limited circumstances. Rhode Island and Massachusetts do not admit a test refusal in either a civil or 
criminal case. While some states have implied consent laws that specifically provide for the admissibility or 
inadmissibility of evidence that the defendant refused to submit to an intoxication test, other states do not 
specifY whether or not refusal evidence is admissible. Admissibility in Criminal Case of Evidence that 
Accused Refused to Take Test of Intoxication, 26 A.L.R. 4th 1112 (1983) (providing a detailed study of the 
admissibility of BAC refusals). When these laws do not expressly deal with admissibility, the courts have 
disagreed with respect to the issue. /d. In another instance, even though a statute allowed for the 
admissibility of refusal evidence, the court held such evidence was inadmissible. See Opinion of the Justices 
to the Senate, 591 N.E.2d 1073, 1077-78 (Mass. 1992) (holding a Massachusetts statute making admissible 
evidence of a refusal to take a breath test unconstitutional); see also Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 90, § 24(e) (2007) 
("Evidence that the defendant failed or refused to consent to such test or analysis shall not be admissible 
against him in a civil or criminal proceeding, but shall be admissible in any action by the registrar under 
paragraph (f) or in any proceedings provided for in section twenty-four N."). 
122. Commonwealth v. Downs, 758 N.E.2d 1062, !065 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001). 
123. Id. at 1064. 
124. /d. 
125. BREATH TEST REFUSALS, supra note 10, at 20-21. But see MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 90, § 24(l)(f)(l) 
(2007) ("[A] suspension for a refusal of either a chemical test or analysis of breath or blood shall run 
consecutively and not concurrently, both as to any additional suspension periods arising from the same 
incident, and as to each other."). 
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some states' implied consent laws that allows an individual to regain his license if 
during the BAC suspension period the individual is brought to trial for OUI and is 
126found not guilty. Such laws fail "to recognize that the suspension is not punishment 
for the alleged OUI, but instead is an administrative consequence for failing to take the 
127breath test." If an individual takes an OUI case to trial and is found not guilty and 
his license is returned prior to the end of the suspension period, "the system tells the 
offender that it was acceptable to refuse to take the test. This defeats the purpose of the 
statute and thwarts any attempt at deterrence." 128 In order to maximize the deterrent 
effect, this loophole should be remedied. 
Laws that impose a less severe or similar penalty for refusing the BAC test than the 
penalty imposed for taking and failing the test also weaken the impact of implied 
consent laws. 129 In 2005, the NHTSA conducted a study of five states' implied consent 
laws, including Oklahoma and Florida. Both of these states' implied consent laws had 
"less-severe combined administrative and criminal penalties for refusal than for those 
130who submit to a breath test and fail." Because the penalty for refusal and failure 
were similar, refusal was "the more beneficial option for any offender in Oklahoma and 
Florida." 131 Legislation addressing this issue "would tip the balance of benefits to the 
side of those taking the BAC test rather than those who refuse the test" and would take 
away the benefit to the offender who refuses the BAC test. 132 When an individual 
knows that refusing to take a BAC test cannot result in a stiffer penalty, there is no 
incentive to take the test. This is especially true in light of the fact that, without BAC 
test results, the likelihood of conviction is significantly reduced. 
Implied consent laws are designed to promote submission to BAC tests in order to 
further deter motorists from engaging in OUI and to provide valuable evidence in the 
detection of an impaired motorist. The variability of sanctions employed by states to 
encourage individuals to submit to a BAC test, coupled with the number of individuals 
who refuse to take the test, clearly indicates that the current system is flawed. This flaw 
126. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24(l)(f)(l) (2007): 
[T]he defendant may immediately, upon the entry of a not guilty finding or dismissal of all charges 
under this section, section 24G, section 24L, or section 13 1/2 of chapter 265, and in the absence of 
any other alcohol related charges pending against said defendant, apply for and be immediately 
granted a hearing before the court which took final action on the charges for the purpose of 
requesting the restoration of said license. At said hearing, there shall be a rebuttable presumption 
that said license be restored, unless the commonwealth shall establish, by a fair preponderance of 
the evidence, that restoration of said license would likely endanger the public safety. 
127. Tina Wescott Cafaro, You Drink, You Drive, You Lose: Or Do You?, 42 GONZ. L. REv. I, 16 (2006). 
128. ld. 
129. A 2005 study "found that test refusal rates are lower in States where the consequences of test refusal 
are greater than the consequences of test failure." NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP'T OF 
TRANSP., COUNTERMEASURES THAT WORK: A HIGHWAY SAFETY COUNTERMEASURE GUIDE FOR STATE 
HIGHWAY SAFETY OFFICES, DOT 809 980 (2006), available at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/airbags/Countermeasures/images/Countermeasures.pdf [hereinafter 
COUNTERMEASURES THAT WORK] (citing BREATH TEST REFUSALS, supra note 10). By way of example, 
New Hampshire's Implied Consent Law calls for a 180 day loss of license for a first time refusal and a six 
month loss of license for a BAC result of 0.08 percent or more. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 265-A:30, 14 
(2007). 
130. BREATH TEST REFUSALS, supra note 10, at 49. As a potential strategy to reduce BAC refusal rates in 
Oklahoma, the NHTSA determined that Oklahoma's law needs to change "so that the penalties for refusing 
the test are again greater than the penalties for taking and failing the test." ld. at 47. 
131. ld. at 49. 
132. ld. 
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enables individuals to circumvent punishment for OUI, reinforcing the notion that they 
can engage in this conduct without consequence, thus encouraging this very dangerous 
and criminal behavior. 
In order to fix this flaw, each state must evaluate its implied consent law. This is 
not an easy task as OUI laws in general and implied consent laws in particular are 
133extremely complex and inconsistent In evaluating these laws, each state should 
revise its implied consent law to make it rigorous and straightforward. 
Ill. STRATEGY TO FIX THE FLAWS IN IMPLIED CONSENT LAWS 
The flaws discussed in Part II make it clear that implied consent laws need major 
revisions. Ultimately, obtaining BAC results and using BAC tests as evidence against 
the motorist at trial must be made easier and refusal by the motorist to submit to the test 
must be made more difficult. The first step in accomplishing this goal is to pass 
legislation in each state that discourages a motorist from refusing to submit to the test. 
In order to achieve this, states must enact uniform and severe penalties for failure to 
comply. This includes a loss of license period that is substantially greater than the loss 
of license period for taking and failing the BAC test. It also includes closing the many 
loopholes in the law including: removal of hardship licenses, barring the imposition of 
concurrent sentences, and prohibiting the return of an individual's license upon 
acquittal. Next, refusal evidence must be admissible at the OUI trial without 
qualification. In addition to license suspensions, the act of refusing to submit to a BAC 
test should constitute a separate crime. Finally, in terms of collecting BAC evidence, 
each state should have provisions that mandate the collection of BAC evidence in any 
case where death or serious bodily injury occurs. 
A. Uniform Penalties 
The discrepancies and complexities found among OUI legislation in individual 
states, between states, and between the state and federal levels create loopholes that 
134"make the prosecution of [OUI] cases both problematic and unpredictable." This 
sends a message to the public that OUI is not an important issue. This message appears 
133. See ROBYN D. ROBERTSON & HERB M. SIMPSON, TRAFFIC INJURY FOUND, OWl SYSTEM 
IMPROVEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH HARD CORE 0RJNKING DRIVERS: PROSECUTION 79-80 (2002), 
www.trafficinjuryresearch.cornlpublications/PDF_publications/Prosecution_Report.pdf ("(T]he statutes 
associated with OWl offenses are some of the most complex criminal statutes in existence. Even homicide 
statutes are considerably shorter than DWI statutes. This is because there has been a remarkable growth in the 
number of DWI laws introduced in recent years. In 1998 alone, legislators in 42 states considered more than 
275 bills that specifically target hard core drunk drivers (citation omitted). Further, the Century Council 
reports that, 'in the 2000 legislative session, 42 states introduced nearly 300 pieces of legislation ... focusing 
on the hard core drunk driver.' (citation omitted). While these changes are obviously intended to strengthen 
DWI laws, an unintended byproduct has been to further complicate an already complex system. Not 
surprisingly, inconsistencies and incompatibilities have arisen-elements of the system do not mesh smoothly 
or seamlessly, creating loopholes, which provide opportunities for repeat offenders, in particular, to avoid 
identification and sanctioning."). See also COUNTERMEASURES THAT WORK, supra note 129, at 1--6 (stating 
that DWI laws and the OWl system are complicated and complex). 
134. ROBERTSON & SIMPSON, supra note 133, at 83. See also id. at 70 ("(A]lack of relatively uniform 
sentencing structures and penalties undermines the effectiveness of the sanctioning process. Offenders are 
permitted to essentially circumvent the sanctioning process by appearing before a particular judge."). 
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to be embraced by the public as the number of people who continue to commit the 
. . . 135 
cnme ts staggenng. 
In order to remedy this situation, the first area that needs to be addressed is the 
length of license suspension for refusing the BAC test. The penalty for refusing to 
submit to a BAC test must be sufficient to remove any incentive a motorist would have 
to refuse to submit. When a state has nominal refusal penalties, such as a ninety day 
loss of license, this does not adequately deter the behavior that the law is attempting to 
eliminate. This is especially true when viewed in comparison to the substantial 
penalties an individual faces if convicted of OUI charges. 136 Many individuals who 
believe or suspect that they are over the legal BAC limit would rather refuse the test and 
face a minor administrative license suspension over taking the test and being convicted 
for OUI and face possible jail time and other sanctions. 137 This situation is seen most 
often with a repeat offender who has been through the criminal justice system and 
knows that it is difficult for a prosecutor to obtain a guilty verdict without a BAC result. 
In many ways, it is this offender that society should be most concerned about 
. h"pums mg. 138 
The National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances 139 advocates 
for legislation that truly encourages an individual to take the test. For a first time 
refuser, it mandates a license suspension for a period of twelve months. 140 Subsequent 
refusals by a repeat offender must be met with enhanced penalties. 141 Enacting 
135. There were 159 million self-reported episodes of alcohol impaired driving in 2005. Of those 159 
million episodes, about 1.4 million drivers were arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol or narcotics. Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, Dep't of Health and Human Services, 
Impaired Driving, http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/drving.htm (last visited Mar. I, 2008); see also 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ALCOHOL AND CRIME, AN ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DATA ON THE 
PREVALENCE OF ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME ix ( 1998), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ac.pdf. 
136. For a list of each state's OUI penalties, see NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 137-55 (Richard A. 
Leiter ed., 6th ed. 2007). 
137. ROBERTSON & SIMPSON, supra note 133 at 48. 
138. Repeat offenders, familiar with the criminal justice system and how to exploit the loopholes, are 
"slipping through the cracks." The public is not being protected against these individuals and the behavior of 
these savvy offenders is not being changed. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF 
TRANSP., YOU DRINK AND DRIVE. YOU LOSE. DRIVING HOME THE FACTS-ABOUT REPEAT OFFENDERS, 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/outreach/safesobr/ydydyl/repeatOff.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008). 
"Among drivers involved in fatal crashes, those with BAC levels of 0.08% or higher were nine times more 
likely to have a prior conviction for driving while impaired (DWI) than were drivers who had not consumed 
alcohol." Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, Dep't of Health and Human Services, Impaired Driving, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/drving.htm (last visited Mar. I, 2008). 
139. The National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances (NCUTLO) is a private, non­
profit membership organization dedicated to providing uniformity of traffic laws and regulations through the 
timely dissemination of information and model legislation on traffic safety issues. The NHTSA has 
acknowledged the importance of this organization and supported the adoption ofNCUTLO's proposed laws. 
See COUNTERMEASURES THAT WORK, supra note 129, at 1-14 ("The National Committee on Uniform Traffic 
Laws and Ordinances has prepared a model DWI law, which has been incorporated into the Uniform Vehicle 
Code (NCUTLO, 1999). It addresses BAC testing, BAC test refusals, higher penalties for high-BAC drivers, 
ALR hearing procedures, and many other issues of current interest. States can use the NCUTLO model as a 
reference point in reviewing their own laws."). 
140. National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, http://www.ncutlo.org (last visited 
Mar. I, 2008). 
141. 	For example, in Arizona: 
[a]fter an arrest a violator shall be requested to submit to and successfully complete any test or 
tests prescribed by subsection A of this section, and if the violator refuses the violator shall be 
informed that the violator's license or permit to drive will be suspended or denied for twelve 
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legislation that mandates a twelve month suspension period for a first time refusal and a 
ninety day suspension period for taking the test and failing it will have a substantial 
deterrent effect on the number of motorists who continue to refuse to submit to the BAC 
test. 
142 
Research demonstrates that instituting administrative license suspensions has a 
positive effect on deterring OUI. 143 
In addition, in order to deter refusals, a "hard" license suspension rule must be 
imposed. A study conducted by the NHTSA found that "[a]mong States with 
significant decreases in test refusals ... [s]ix out of [eight] States with significant 
decreases [in test refusals] have hard license suspension periods." 144 Motorists who 
have their license suspended because they refuse to submit to a BAC test should not be 
eligible for hardship licenses. By cutting off the opportunity to gain a hardship license, 
the incentive to take the test will increase significantly. An individual who understands 
the difficulty in proving an OUI case without BAC results, and who knows that the 
suspension period can be mitigated with a hardship license, will be more likely to refuse 
to provide a BAC sample. It is easy to refuse the test when a motorist knows that there 
is a way to circumvent the penalty for violating the law. In order to encourage BAC 
tests, hardship licenses should only be granted to a motorist who submits to the BAC 
test and is subsequently convicted. In contrast, hardship licenses should not be 
available to motorists whose license has been suspended because of a BAC refusal. 
Under this system, motorists are encouraged to take the BAC test and are only offered a 
hardship license after conviction and upon the installation of an ignition interlock 
device. 145 
In an attempt to punish those who are caught operating a motor vehicle with a high 
BAC level, 146 some states have enacted legislation that distinguishes between levels of 
intoxication and creates severe sanctions for those demonstrating a higher BAC. 147 The 
rationale behind this type of legislation is that OUI offenders with higher BAC levels 
months, or for two years for a second or subsequent refusal within a period of eighty-four months, 
unless the violator expressly agrees to submit to and successfully completes the test or tests. 
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 28-13218 (WEST 2007). In Massachusetts, the penalty for refusing the BAC test is 
a 180 day loss of license for a first offense, three year loss of license for a second offense, five year loss of 
license for a third offense, and lifetime loss of license for a fourth offense. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90 § 
24(l)(f)(l) (2007). 
142. COUNTERMEASURES THAT WORK, supra note 129, at 1-10 ("If the penalties for refusal are less 
severe than the penalties for failing the test, many drivers will refuse.") (citation omitted). 
143. /d. 
144. BREATH TEST REFUSALS, supra note I 0, at II. 
145. An ignition interlock is a device that has a breath tester that drivers blow into to measure their blood 
alcohol level, and if alcohol is detected, the device prevents the vehicle from starting. MARGARET C. JASPER, 
DRUNK DRIVING LAW 4, 127-129 (1999). 
146. M.A.D.D., Mothers Against Drunk Driving - Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving - Laws, 
http://rnadd.org/Drunk-Driving/Drunk-Driving!Laws/Law.aspx?law=20 (last visited Mar. I, 2008) ("High 
BAC refers to a driver who drives with a blood alcohol concentration of [0.15 percent] or higher at the time of 
arrest. . . . [Fifty-eight] percent of alcohol-related fatalities involve someone with a [0.15 percent] BAC or 
higher. This is because a driver at a [0.15 percent] BAC level is 382 times more likely to be involved in a 
fatal crash than someone who has had nothing to drink.") (citation omitted). 
147. The following states have high BAC laws: Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. !d. 
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pose a greater risk to the public than offenders with lower BAC levels. 148 The law 
attempts to target high-risk individuals such as "hard core, persistent, chronic, or repeat 
0 149 150 
"dn"nk"mg dnvers. Th"IS type o f 1 aw may have some speci "fiIC deterrence benefiIt, 
but it ultimately works against the purpose of the implied consent law. High BAC laws 
effectively discourage drivers from taking the test when the penalty for refusing the test 
is more lenient than the penalty for operating with a high BAC. 151 While the aim 
behind the high BAC law is admirable, the negative effect it can have on the problem of 
refusals is not. 
As an additional measure to tighten the laws, if the prosecution is able to gain a 
conviction for OUI, the sentence imposed for that conviction should be consecutive to 
the suspension period for the BAC refusal as the punishments are for two separate 
events: refusing a BAC test and conviction for OUI. This issue arises after a criminal 
adjudication of guilt and at the sentencing phase. Here, judges are typically afforded 
great discretion in determining what type of sentence to impose. 152 As two 
commentators have noted: 
Broad judicial discretion in DWI cases, as with other criminal cases, often leads to 
judge-shopping, meaning that a defendant will attempt to have their case heard in 
front of a judge known to impose lesser sanctions .... [The] lack of relatively 
uniform sentencing structures and penalties undermines the effectiveness of the 
148. ANNE T. MCCARTT & VERONIKA SHABANOVA NORTHRUP, ENHANCED SANCTIONS FOR HIGHER 
BACS: EVALUATION OF MINNESOTA'S HIGH-BAC LAW, DOT HS 809 677, at I (2004), available at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohoVEnhancedSanctions/HS809677.pdf ('There is evidence that 
DWI offenders with higher BACs are more likely than DWI offenders with lower BACs to be involved in a 
crash. Data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) indicate that in the year 
2000, [sixty-four] percent of drinking drivers who were fatally injured had BACs of .15 or higher." (citation 
omitted). 
149. !d. 
!50. COUNTERMEASURES THAT WORK, supra note 129, at 1-11 ("In the only evaluation of high-BAC 
sanctions to date, McCartt and Northrup (2003, 2004) found that Minnesota's law appears to have increased 
the severity of case dispositions for high-BAC offenders, although the severity apparently declined somewhat 
over time. They also found some evidence of an initial decrease in recidivism among high-BAC first 
offenders. The BAC test refusal rate declined for first offenders and was unchanged for repeat offenders after 
the high-BAC law was implemented. [The authors point out that] Minnesota's law has a high threshold of 
[0.20 percent] BAC, relatively strong administrative and criminal sanctions, and strong penalties for BAC test 
refusal."). 
151. McCARTT & NORTHRUP, supra note 148, at 6 ("The most common concern was that the imposition 
of high-BAC sanctions might increase the number of alcohol test refusals if the state's penalties for refusal 
were insufficiently strong. At least one state, Maine, increased the penalties for test refusals when a high­
SAC statute was enacted."). 
152. For repeat offender, some states have mandatory minimum sentences, taking the discretion away 
from judges in terms of length of imprisonment. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(l)(a)(l) (2007) ("If 
the defendant has been previously convicted or assigned to an alcohol or controlled substance education, 
treatment, or rehabilitation program by a court of the commonwealth, or any other jurisdiction because of a 
like offense two times preceding the date of the commission of the offense for which he has been convicted, 
the defendant shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than fifteen thousand dollars 
and by imprisonment for not less than one hundred and eighty days nor more than two and one-half years or 
by a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than fifteen thousand dollars and by imprisonment in the 
state prison for not less than two and one-half years nor more than five years; provided, however, that the 
sentence imposed upon such person shall not be reduced to less than one hundred and fifty days, nor 
suspended, nor shall any such person be eligible for probation, parole, or furlough or receive any deduction 
from his sentence for good conduct until he shall have served one hundred and fifty days of such sentence ... 
."). 
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sanctioning process. Offenders are permitted to essentially circumvent the 
. . b . b fi . I . d 153sanctwnmg process y appearmg e ore a part1cu ar JU ge. 
Even though most OUI statutes include a license suspension for the OUI conviction, 
many judges will impose concurrent suspensions for the BAC refusal and OUI 
conviction. The two penalties are separate and distinct for two separate and distinct 
actions: one penalty is punishment for an OUI conviction while the other is a sanction 
for a BAC refusal. As such, they should be treated separately. Case law clearly holds 
that applying separate punishment for these two different matters is not double 
jeopardy. 154 When the defendant's license revocation is imposed concurrently, the 
resulting punishment does not deter a motorist from future acts of refusal. 
For similar reasoning, an individual's license that was suspended for a BAC refusal 
should not be reinstated upon an acquittal for OUI. In Massachusetts, 
the defendant may immediately, upon the entry of a not guilty finding or 
dismissal of all charges under this section, section 24G, section 24L, or 
section 13 1/2 of chapter 265, and in the absence of any other alcohol related 
charges pending against said defendant, apply for and be immediately 
granted a hearing before the court which took final action on the charges for 
the purpose of requesting the restoration of said license. At said hearing, 
there shall be a rebuttable presumption that said license be restored, unless 
the commonwealth shall establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, 
that restoration of said license would likely endanger the public safety. 155 
Legislation that allows such action fails to recognize "that the suspension is not 
punishment for the alleged OUI, but instead is an administrative consequence for failing 
to take the breath test." 156 Reinstating an individual's license in this scenario sends a 
contradictory and negative message to the offender: that it was acceptable to refuse to 
153. ROBERTSON & SIMPSON, supra note 133, at 70. 
154. See Luk v. Commonwealth, 658 N.E.2d 664, 671 n.l6 (Mass. 1995) (listing state court decisions 
finding that double jeopardy is not implicated: State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 758 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); 
State v. Fox, No. MV94 31 52 60, 1995 WL 559000 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1995) (mem.); State v. 
Schwander, Nos. IN94-08-1350-IN94-08-1351, IN94-08-1352, IN94-08-1353, IN94-08-1354, 1995 WL 
413248 (Del. Super. Ct. June I 5, 1995); Jackson v. State, 462 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Higa, 
897 P.2d 928 (Haw. 1995); State v. Talavera, 905 P.2d 633 (Idaho 1995); State v. Funke, 531 N.W.2d 124, 
126 (Iowa 1995) (quoting State v. Marvin, 307 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Iowa 1981)); State v. Jones, 666 A.2d 128 
(Md. 1995); State v. Parker, 538 N.W.2d 141 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 
1995); State v. Cassady, 662 A.2d 955 (N.H. 1995); State ex rei. Schwartz v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044 (N.M. 
1995); People v. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1995); State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49 
(N.D. 1995); State v. Miller, No. 2-94-32, 1995 WL 275770 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 1995); State v. Sims, No. 
CA94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1995); Tench v. Commonwealth, 462 S.E.2d 922 
(Va. Ct. App. 1995); State v. McMaster, 543 N.W.2d 499 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)). 
155. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90 § 24(l)(f)(l). See a/so GA. CODE ANN.§ 40-5-67.l(G)(4)(2007) ("In the 
event the person is acquitted of a violation of Code Section 40-6-391 or such charge is initially disposed of 
other than by a conviction or plea of nolo contendere, then the suspension shall be terminated and deleted 
from the driver's license record. An accepted plea of nolo contendere shall be entered on the driver's license 
record and shall be considered and counted as a conviction for purposes of any future violations of Code 
Section 40-6-391. In the event of an acquittal or other disposition other than by a conviction or plea of nolo 
contendere, the driver's license restoration fee shall be promptly returned by the department to the licensee."). 
156. Cafaro, supra note 127, at 16. 
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take the test. 157 Such a message defeats the purpose of the statute and thwarts any 
attempt at deterrence. 158 By failing to take the BAC test, the individual has deprived 
the prosecution of vital evidence and should be punished harshly for doing so. Often an 
individual's acquittal is premised in large part on the lack ofBAC evidence. 159 To give 
the motorist's license back rewards them for the very act implied consent laws are 
attempting to deter. As such, the reinstatement of the license upon acquittal is contrary 
to the purpose behind implied consent laws. Statutes such as these that undercut 
implied consent laws must be eliminated. 
B. Admit BAC Refusal in Evidence 
Obtaining a conviction in an OUI case is a difficult task. Given the general 
public's inclination to sympathize with OUI drivers, 160 the tendency is to "give the 
defendant a break" and not convict. In arriving at a verdict, many jurors "employ a 'but 
for the grace of God go I' rationale." 161 In addition to contending with public 
perceptions and inclinations to acquit, prosecutors in some states are forced to contend 
with laws that bar the admission ofBAC test refusal in evidence. 162 At trial, the lack of 
BAC evidence "makes it more difficult for a prosecutor to refute alternative theories of 
the crime, such as the suspect was not intoxicated but was, instead, having a diabetic 
reaction, or was on prescription medication, or had some physical condition that 
accounts for his/her behavior." 163 When the prosecution is prohibited from telling the 
fact-fmder that the defendant refused the test, OUI defendants risk little by refusing 
testing whenever possible. Permitting the prosecution to introduce a defendant's refusal 
to submit to testing into evidence is not only justified but is fair, as most jurors are 
"aware of the existence of chemical testing and may refuse to convict when such 
evidence is not made available by the prosecution." 164 However, "if the prosecution is 
permitted to explain the absence of test results, jurors would be less likely to acquit on 
the irrational basis that the prosecution has produced no 'scientific' evidence for 
conviction." 165 States that allow such evidence at trial do so to ensure that jurors are 
not misled into drawing such incorrect inferences by the absence ofBAC testing. 166 
157. !d. 
158. !d. 
159. See supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text. 
160. Susan Waite Crump, The Admission ofChemical Test Refusals After State v. Neville; Drunk Drivers 
Cannot Take the Fifth, 59 N.D. L. REv 349, 350 (1983) ("(J]urors more readily identify with a[n OUI] 
defendant than they do with defendants accused of violent erimes. Most jurors, if not their friends and 
relatives, have engaged in the prohibited conduct themselves.") (citation omitted). 
161. Taslitz, supra note II, at 68 (discussing the continuing attitude of jurors regarding OUI cases and 
citing a study that found that between "1958 and 1993 jurors' leniency-that is, their willingness to acquit­
remained substantially unchanged. Interestingly, although jurors continue to acquit more frequently than do 
judges, judicial willingness to acquit has increased since 1958."). For an analysis of research by sociologists 
and psychologists regarding the dynamics of jury deliberation and jury decisions versus judge decisions, see 
Rebecca Snyder Bromley, Jury Leniency in Drinking and Driving Cases Has It Changed? 1958 Versus 1993, 
20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 27 (1996). 
162. See sources cited supra note 121. 
163. ROBERTSON & SIMPSON, supra note 133, at xiv. 
164. Crump, supra note 160, at 351. 
165. !d. 
166. See, e.g., 75 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 1547(e) (2006) ("In any summary proceeding or criminal 
proceeding in which the defendant is charged with a violation of section 3802 or any other violation of this 
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C. Criminalize Refusal to Take the BAC Test 
One way to make the penalty for refusal to submit to a BAC test harsh is to 
criminalize such conduct. 167 Among States with significant decreases in test refusals, 
two have criminalized test refusals (California and Minnesota). 168 As a crime of 
omission, the State would be required to prove that the defendant failed to perform a 
mandatory duty and that the defendant was aware of the condition that created such a 
legal duty to act. 169 
Opponents of creating a separate crime for refusal argue that a law compelling an 
individual "to choose between taking a breath test, which could expose them to criminal 
liability, or refusing the test, which also carries criminal consequences, presents them 
with the 'cruel' dilemma that the Fifth Amendment is designed to prevent." 170 This 
argument fails to take into consideration that BAC refusal evidence is already 
compelled due to the fact that prior to operating a motor vehicle all motorists agree, 
albeit impliedly, to submit to testing. When a state decides to forego enforcing the 
implied consent statute by refusing to physically compel an OUI suspect to produce a 
BAC sample, it is entirely legitimate that there is a statute criminalizing the refusal to 
produce a sample voluntarily. 171 Where a state "could have taken [the defendant's] 
blood by force, it does not 'compel' a defendant to testify against himself when it 
allows him the choice of either producing the evidence or facing criminal charges-and 
even a mandatory prison sentence ... for withholding it." 172 Motorists confronted with 
this choice are faced with an "unpleasant choice-submit to the breath test and be 
prosecuted for DUI, or refuse to take the test and be prosecuted for criminal refusal." 173 
Still, admitting evidence of a refusal "no more violates the Fifth Amendment than 
title arising out of the same action, the fact that the defendant refused to submit to chemical testing as required 
by subsection (a) may be introduced in evidence along with other testimony concerning the circumstances of 
the refusal. No presumptions shall arise from this evidence but it may be considered along with other factors 
concerning the charge."). 
167. For a list of states that criminalize the act of refusing to take the BAC test, see BLOOD ALCOHOL 
CONCENTRATION TEST REFUSAL LAWS, supra note Ill. Alaska's BAC refusal statute classifies the crime as 
a class A misdemeanor with penalties ranging from seventy-two consecutive hours of imprisonment and a fine 
for a first conviction to 360 days of imprisonment and a fine for a fourth or subsequent conviction for BAC 
refusal. ALASKA STAT.§ 28.35.032 (2007). 
168. BREATH TEST REFUSALS, supra note I 0. 
169. See Yang v. State, 107 P.3d 302,309 (Alaska 2005); Alaska Stat. §28.35.032(a) ("!fa person under 
arrest for operating a motor vehicle ... while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, inhalant, or 
controlled substance refuses the request of a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test authorized 
under ... AS 28.35.031(a), or if a person involved in a motor vehicle accident that causes death or serious 
physical injury to another person refuses the request of a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test 
authorized under ... AS 28.35.03l(g), after being advised by the officer that the refusal will result in the 
denial or revocation of the driver's license, privilege to drive, or privilege to obtain a license, that the refusal 
may be used against the person in a civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of an act alleged to have 
been committed by the person while operating a motor vehicle ... while under the influence of an alcoholic 
beverage, inhalant, or controlled substance, and that the refusal is a crime, a chemical test may not be given, 
except as provided by AS 28.35.035."). 
170. State v. Morale, 811 A.2d 185, 188 (Vt. 2002) (holding that there was no violation of the Fifth 
Amendment and Miranda did not apply in the prosecution for criminal refusal to submit to breath test). 
171. /d. 
172. /d. at 189 (quoting Deering v. Brown, 839 F.2d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
173. /d. at 188. 
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would evidence of the breath test had defendants submitted to it." 174 Since nominal 
penalties for refusal encourage this behavior, especially when compared to the 
substantial penalties faced upon conviction of OUI charges, imposing criminal 
sanctions to accompany the administrative penalty of loss of license or fine will 
increase the costs of refusing and thus encourage more people to take the BAC test. 175 
D. Mandatory Testing Where Death or Serious Bodily Injury Occurs 
Implied consent laws are built on the premise that an individual does not have the 
right to refuse a BAC test. The Supreme Court in Schmerber recognized that a simple 
blood-alcohol test is safe, painless, and commonplace, and expressly allowed a state to 
force a person suspected of OUI to submit to a BAC test as long as the manner 
employed does not shock the conscience of the court. 176 However, most states do not 
allow law enforcement to take this evidence by force. 177 The rationale behind 
forbidding compelled testing is to prevent the police from engaging in violent 
confrontations with OUI suspects. 178 While this is a legitimate rationale, the resulting 
deprivation of vital BAC evidence is particularly troublesome when a suspected 
impaired driver is involved in a motor vehicle accident that causes a death or serious 
bodily injury. 
Improving BAC testing rates for drivers involved in fatal crashes and crashes that 
cause serious bodily injury is critical to combat impaired driving. For example, in 
2004, there were 164 people that died on Wyoming roadways. Fifty-three of those 
people were killed in crashes involving alcohol. However, seventy percent of the 
surviving drivers were not tested for impairment. 179 In these instances, BAC testing 
should be compulsory. 180 Such a law would make a significant difference in preventing 
impaired drivers from "slipping through the cracks" and would give law enforcement 
the critical evidence they need to hold the appropriate party accountable. 
I 74. !d. (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 458 U.S. 553, 564 (1983)). 
175. See National Hardcore Drunk Driver Project, The National Agenda: A System to Fight Hardcore 
DWJ at 31, available at http://dwidata.org/downloads/hdd_sourcebookl.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) ("In 
Minnesota, where the test refusal rate is 14%, the laws related to test refusals are among the strongest in the 
nation. Minnesota is one of five states (Alaska, Minnesota, Nebraska, Rhode Island and Vermont) where 
BAC test refusal carries a criminal penalty."). 
176. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. 
177. See U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 849 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Some states have already passed 
legislation authorizing police to collect blood samples, with or without consent, from any driver reasonably 
suspected of drunk driving."). See also Joseph T. Hallinan, Police Draw Blood, Literally, as They Fight to 
Put a Stop to Intoxicated Drivers, L.A. DAILY, Mar. 24, 2004, at 4 (noting that Alaska, Arizona, Florida, 
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, and Texas have all passed legislation authorizing forcible extraction of 
blood samples). 
178. Neville, 459 U.S. at 560. 
179. COUNCIL ON IMPAIRED DRIVING, WHITE PAPER - MANDATORY CHEMICAL TESTING FOR ALL 
DRIVERS IN FATAL AND SERIOUS BODILY INJURY CRASHES I (2006), available at 
http://www.iprwyoming.org/asp/researchtopics/docs/14 7 _Mandatory_ Chemical_ Testing_of_Ail_Drivers_ 
in_Fatal_and_Serious_Injury _Crashes. pdf. 
180. ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY, THE 2007 ROADMAP TO STATE HIGHWAY SAFETY 
LAWS 32 (2007), available at http://www.saferoads.org/Roadmap2007.pdf ("Currently, [thirty-seven] states 
require drivers who are killed in a fatal crash to be tested for the presence of alcohol. ... Thirty-nine states 
and DC require that surviving drivers of a crash involving a death have their BACs tested .... In total, 
[twenty-nine] states require that both killed and surviving drivers be tested, and three states (RI, TN and VA) 
do not require BAC testing in either instance."). 
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It is simply unacceptable to allow drivers responsible for fatal and serious-injury 
crashes to escape prosecution[,] . . . and it is unjust to allow a driver to refuse a 
[BAC] test after [hurting] another person. Action must be taken to close the 
181loopholes and gaps in our legislative and enforcement systems." 
CONCLUSION 
Implied consent laws represent a "bargain between drivers and the State .... In 
exchange for the use of the roads within the State, drivers consent to have their [BAC 
level] tested if a police officer has reason to believe the driver is intoxicated." 182 Once 
this agreement is entered into, drivers should not be able to refuse to produce a BAC 
sample. Implied consent laws must be given some teeth if they are going to have the 
intended impact of deterring impaired driving. For implied consent laws to have any 
meaning, motorists must be required to take the BAC test. 
Current modes designed to ensure compliance with BAC testing are failing. This is 
due, in large part, to the lack of serious and consistent repercussions for refusing the 
test. A number of measures are possible to fix the fatal flaws in OUI enforcement 
schemes. In combination, they have the potential to increase the ability of law 
enforcement and prosecutors to deter and punish the crime ofOUI. Many people would 
rather accept the lighter penalty of administrative loss of license than risk having a BAC 
test demonstrate intoxication, resulting in a criminal conviction for OUI. 
Administrative sanctions imposing loss of license for a few months are insufficient to 
encourage motorists to take the test. 
Hardship licenses, concurrent sentences, and the return of a license upon an 
acquittal also take away the incentive to take the test. Motorists know that the threat of 
conviction for OUI is tenuous in the absence of BAC evidence. Therefore, when an 
individual refuses, evidence of that refusal must be admissible in the criminal 
proceeding. Additionally, the act of refusing must be a crime itself with stiff penalties 
imposed upon conviction. In cases where a car accident results in death or serious 
bodily injury, BAC testing must be mandatory even in the face of a refusal. 
As the Neville Court stated, "the choice to submit or refuse to take a blood-alcohol 
test will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make. But the criminal process 
often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices." 183 Once that difficult 
choice is made, the defendant must live with the consequences and the consequences 
should be more than imaginary. Otherwise, implied consent laws are meaningless. 
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